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Interpretation: Economic engagement is the expansion of state-to-state ties

Kahler and Kastner 6

(Kahler, Miles, Professor of Pacific International Relations at University of California, San Diego, and Kastner, Scott, associate professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, 2006, “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN”, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California, San Diego) FS

Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized

“its” means belonging to

Oxford Dictionaries no date

(Oxford Dictionaries online, no date, “its”, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/its?view=uk>)

determiner

belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified:

turn the camera on its side

he chose the area for its atmosphere

 belonging to or associated with a child or animal of unspecified sex:

a baby in its mother’s womb

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B. Violation: The aff is a private action within the state department with no interaction with Cuba

C. Voting issue

 1. Ground- relations disads, politics, and PICs out of government engagement are the core of the topic

 2. Limits- only predictable limit on a near infinite combination of companies, NGOs and individuals

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Lifting sanctions destroys Cuba’s urban agriculture system

Gonzalez 3 (Carmen, “SEASONS OF RESISTANCE: SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN CUBA”, Summer of 2003, book p. 729-33, Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external – the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path. Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions. Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union. Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.n413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time. It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban sovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.n416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries. Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers – as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century. Cuba is once again at a crossroads – as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans. The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation.

Urban agriculture is key to Cuban quality of life and is modeled internationally

Peters 10 (Kathryn, “Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution” J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 203, <http://law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf>, LL.M. expected 2011, University of Arkansas School of Law, Graduate Program in Agricultural and Food Law; J.D. 2010, University of Oregon School of Law)

While urban agriculture was a response to a dramatic crisis in ¶ Cuba’s history, through the development of a community-based ¶ system of cultivation on previously vacant lots employing organic ¶ farming techniques, Cuba has created a sustainable food production ¶ system.189 As of 2005, Havana was producing over ninety percent of ¶ the perishable produce consumed in its city as well as a significant ¶ portion of its milk and meat.190 With government support, the urban ¶ gardens have become a profitable economic enterprise for many ¶ Cubans.191 Local access to fresh foods has added diversity to the ¶ Cuban diet and reduced the carbon footprint associated with its food ¶ supply by reducing the transportation and chemical input required to ¶ grow and transport the food.192 The development of urban farming ¶ has also ensured food security for Cuba.193 The success of Cuba’s ¶ system has established the country as a model for the urban ¶ production of sustainable agriculture around the world.194¶ In transitioning to a sustainable urban agricultural system, Cuba ¶ has drastically reduced its harmful impacts on the environment. ¶ Cubans have been able to significantly reduce their carbon footprints ¶ as their food supply is no longer shipped across oceans and Cuban ¶ residents can walk to local markets for fresh produce rather than drive to grocery stores.195 Reduced mechanization in food production ¶ further reduces carbon emissions. Increased urban vegetation also ¶ mitigates the impact of climate change because vegetation has a ¶ cooling effect when air temperatures are high.196 Because much of ¶ Cuba’s urban land is now vegetative, surface temperatures in Cuba ¶ may remain cooler due to the thermoregulation created by the ¶ vegetation cover.197¶ According to Dr. Nelso Camponioni Concepción, the Cuban ¶ government, through its urban agricultural program, aims “to gain the ¶ most food from every square meter of available space.”198 By ¶ utilizing available urban space for sustainable food production, Cuba ¶ is reducing its impact on the planet’s carrying capacity. The organic ¶ urban gardening techniques do not consume greenspace or harm the ¶ environment; therefore, measuring the true cost of externalities is not ¶ an issue. The growth of the urban gardens has created an increasing ¶ food supply and a new economy for many Cubans without negatively ¶ impacting the environment or society. Urban gardens in Cuba promote social equity in many ways. Perhaps most important, urban gardens have enriched the quality of life in urban neighborhoods. As neighbors share plants, gardening techniques, and food, and as farm stands have become a part of the neighborhood, community life has been enriched. The Cuban diet has also been enriched; Cubans now have access to a greater variety of fresher, healthier food at lower cost.199 Buying fresh, organic, locally grown food exemplifies ethical consumerism and self-reliance within communities. Equally important, the current generation of urban gardeners will leave future generations fertile, nutrient-rich land on which they can produce food for themselves. Cuba’s urban gardening system is the result of a breach to its national security.200 Due to the development of the urban gardens, Cuba is no longer reliant on food and oil imports; an energy crisis or oil shortage would not impact Cuba’s food production system. The availability of fresh food and gardening inputs within neighborhoods further ensures Cuba’s national security, as an attack on the transportation infrastructure would not significantly affect Cuba’s food distribution system.

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Text: The United States federal government should abolish the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism and should retain the sanctions already levied by said list.

Revisions to SST list fall short of any broader ideological reform – only removing access to the distinction prompts change

Jackson 7 – your author (Richard Jackson is Reader in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, and a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV). He is the founding editor of the journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2007, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics of State Power,” Paper prepared for International Studies Association’s 47th annual convention,<http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-Paper-CTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1)>

From a discourse analytic perspective, it can be argued that the terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is always in danger of promoting a narrow set of partisan interests and discrete political projects. For example, the discourse describes an almost infinite number of potential „terrorist sanctuaries‟ or „havens‟, each of which then logically becomes a legitimate target for various kinds of counter-terrorism measures. As noted above, the literature identifies a large list of potential „terrorist havens‟, including: all failed, weak or poor states; the widely accepted list of state sponsors of terrorism; a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations; Islamic charities and NGOs; informal, unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the internet; diasporas in western countries; groups and regions characterised by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical Islamist organisations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent and revolutionary movements; and „extremist‟ ideologies – among others. The identification of these groups and domains as „terrorist sanctuaries‟ or „havens‟ consequently functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions against them – all in the name of counter-terrorism. That is, the discourse can be deployed politically in a variety of ways: domestically for example, it can be used to discipline society, demonise dissent, control the media, enhance the powers of the security services, centralise executive power, create a surveillance society and expand state regulation of social life. In addition to this broad legitimating function, the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse can also support a range of discrete political projects and partisan interests, including: re-targeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counter-insurgency programmes where the real aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order; delefitimising all forms of counter-hegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal international order; and selectively justifying projects of regime change,83 economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political movements. In the end, the discourse functions – in its present form – to permit the extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically. Far from being an objective academic analysis therefore, it may serve a number of distinctly ideological purposes.

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Congress pulling punches now - Obama’s investment of capital is key to dissuade hawks and AIPAC

John Hudson, “Despite AIPAC Lobbying, Obama Admin Calms Congress on Iran Talks,” Foreign Policy, 10/23/13

 On Wednesday, the Obama administration held its first classified briefing with Congress on its high-stakes nuclear talks with Iran. Despite deep skepticism of White House engagement with Iran -- and despite a fresh lobbying effort by AIPAC -- exiting lawmakers appeared mollified by the State Department's chief nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman, who led this month's talks with Iran in Geneva. The talks between Iran and six world powers this month offer the Obama administration the chance to solve a key foreign policy goal: Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon without the use of military force. But many in Congress fear Iran's newly-elected President Hassan Rouhani could be using the talks as a stalling tactic to reach breakout nuclear capacity. Despite those concerns, lawmakers expressed a willingness to give the administration's diplomatic efforts a chance. "All I know is that sanctions seem to be working and that's a positive," Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD), ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, told The Cable. "If they weren't working, Iran would not be reaching out at this point." "I appreciate the administration coming up and briefing us on what's going on with the talks," said House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA), who rarely misses a chance to attack the administration's Middle East policies. "I fully support efforts at applying pressure and making sure there is a viable military threat so that perhaps a diplomatic resolution can occur ... I remain concerned about the threat of Iran's actions in terms of pursuing its goal of nuclear capability and will remain involved in oversight of that issue." The meeting was well-attended with members of various House committees, including Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Appropriations and Financial Services, participating. Several powerful lawmakers whisked out of the classified briefing without speaking to the press, including House Intel chairman Mike Rogers (R-MI), State and Foreign Ops Appropriations Subcommittee chairwoman Kay Granger (R-TX), House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD), and House Foreign Affairs chairman Ed Royce (R-CA). The consultations with Congress have coincided with an effort by AIPAC lobbyists to fire them up on the issue. Last week, the pro-Israel group sent a memo to lawmakers insisting that Iran does not have the right to enrich uranium. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not speak about the right of enrichment," reads the memo, obtained by The Cable from a Congressional aide. "Even if there were such a right, Iran's extensive decades-long violations of the NPT would have negated it." The Rouhani government insists on the right to continue enriching uranium on its own soil, something the White House has hinted it might accept under stringent inspections, but hasn't officially accepted. Tehran has also yet to signal a clear willingness to shutter its underground, heavily-fortified nuclear plant at Qom, a source of particular concern for Israel because it is largely impervious to their air strikes, or to dismantle any of its centrifuges. An AIPAC official would not say how many lawmakers received the memo, but noted that it was also sent to media outlets. In any event, hawks in Congress appear to be pulling their punches, for the most part. (The sole exceptions appear to be Florida Senator Marco Rubio and Illinois Senator Mark Kirk, who want to add sanctions on Iran immediately.) Rep. Eliot Engel, ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a prominent critic of Iran's nuclear program, said he was "satisfied with the briefing." "I thought it was laid out well," he said, noting that he remains adamant that the U.S. not relent on pressuring Iran until it dismantles its nuclear program. "We all have the same goal. We don't want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. There are various ways you can get there. They laid out some of their thoughts and ideas on it, which I can't share with you, but I certainly do think it's worthwhile talking to the Iranians and seeing if this is real." The next round of Iran talks begin in Geneva on Nov. 7.

Bipartisan effort to not remove Cuba

Ros-Lehtian 13 – Congresswoman For FL-27 (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Bipartisan Congressional Group Asks Administration to Keep Cuba on State Sponsor of Terrorism List, Official website of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, April 29, 2013, <http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/bipartisan-congressional-group-asks-administration-keep-cuba-state-sponsor-terrorism>) TA

A bipartisan group of Congressional Members (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio Sires) explained today in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry the reasons why Cuba should remain on the State Sponsors of Terrorism.¶ Statement by Ros-Lehtinen:¶ “The Castro regime must continue to be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism as it:¶ supports and collaborates with Iran and Syria, fellow sponsors of terrorism;¶ provides a safe haven for members of terrorist organizations such as the FARC and ETA;¶ offers sanctuary for fugitives from the U.S. (such as cop killer Joanne Chesimard);¶ unjustly holds a U.S. citizen hostage (Alan Gross);¶ ordered the Brothers to the Rescue shootdown resulting in the deaths of U.S. citizens; and¶ continues its active espionage networks that attempt to undermine U.S. interests and poses a risk to our national security.

Agreement on Iranian proliferation solves regional tension, Iranian prolif, and war now – new congressional sanctions crush the fragile momentum

NIAC, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the interests of the Iranian-American community, “NIAC Applauds US-Iran Diplomatic Progress, Warns Congress Against Sabotaging a Deal,” 10/16/2013. http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9893

Washington, DC - The National Iranian American Council released the following statement after the conclusion of diplomatic negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva:¶ ¶ The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) applauds the U.S. and Iran for engaging in substantive, productive negotiations in Geneva over the past two days. Both Iran and the U.S. and other members of the P5+1 have declared their commitment to reaching a solution that introduces verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear program and ends the nuclear standoff. Such an agreement is possible and achievable if each side remains committed to the diplomatic track and halts escalatory measures that have prevented diplomatic progress in the past.¶ ¶ Ahead of new negotiations that are scheduled for November 7 and 8, it is critical that the U.S. Congress not interfere. New sanctions legislation would sabotage this promising but fragile process. The Senate must not complicate the talks by tying the hands of the President or undermining confidence that the U.S. can reciprocate in these negotiations. A verifiable agreement to reduce tensions, ensure Iran never develops nuclear weapons, and prevent war is possible if Congress gives diplomacy a chance to succeed. The consideration of new sanctions would undermine a deal. ¶ ¶ The new, positive atmosphere surrounding talks is due, in large part, to a shift in tone and approach from each party. The P5+1, critically, showed flexibility by agreeing to discuss the endgame with Iran, departing from their previous focus on short-term confidence building measures. Each side must continue to focus on a pragmatic approach towards a shared vision for the endgame in order to overcome the deep, long-held mistrust that has fueled escalatory policies. ¶ ¶ Further credit should be given to the injection of political capital into the negotiating process. Direct talks between Kerry and Zarif on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, and the historic phone call between Presidents Obama and Rouhani, have helped to break the taboo of diplomatic contact between the U.S. and Iran. NIAC supports further bilateral discussions between the United States and Iran to continue progress on the nuclear issue, and to address other issues of concern at the earliest possible opportunity, including human rights and regional security.¶ ¶ However, in Congress, Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ) introduced a war authorization along with 14 other Republicans. In the Senate, the Banking Committee is set to consider new sanctions that passed the House just days before the inauguration of Iran’s new President. If either measure passes, it would reinforce Iranian fears that the United States is really interested in regime change and is unwilling or unable to deliver sanctions relief that is required by any deal. It is time for those in Congress who are serious about preventing war and finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff to stand up against efforts to sabotage talks and box the U.S. into a military confrontation.

Deal prevents global nuclear war

Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11

(Eric S, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

n-player competition

Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

Politics

1. The aff does nothing to reframe the narrative surrounding “terrorism” in relation to Cuba – multiple barriers

A. Title 22 export restrictions

Reeves, 11 (Jeremy R, “A New Typology for State Sponsored International Terrorism”, December 2011, US Airforce Major)

In 2002, the U.S. government codified a law that created a distinct category for states that do not openly support international terrorist organizations but do not take positive action to curtail them either. Title 22, section 2781 states “No defense article or defense service may be sold or licensed for export...to a foreign country that the President determines and certifies to Congress...is not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.”249 States designated as “Not Fully Cooperating” by the President are identified in the Federal Register and the State Department reports on their status in the annual Country Reports. This law represents a step in the right direction. It recognizes that a distinction exists between state sponsors of terrorism and those states that simply tolerate a terrorist organization’s existence. However, implementation of this law has been problematic. First, the only consequence of being labeled a state that does “Not Fully Cooperate” is a total ban on defense weapons and services. On the surface, this seems prudent. However, in some cases the state may not be employing an effective counter-terrorism strategy because the terrorists outgun it. Like the State Department’s list of state sponsors, the law applied to states “Not Fully Cooperating” allows for no flexibility and offers little incentive for states to come off the list. Second, and more importantly, the label is based solely on the President’s discretion. The law offers no criteria for how states should be designated. Therefore, like the State Department’s list of state sponsors, the tendency will be to utilize this designation as a tool for political extortion. Proof of such use is found simply by looking at the current list of states “Not Fully Cooperating.” Today, the list includes Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, and Eritrea.

B. Political Pandering

Williams, 5/3 (Carol J. Williams, 5/3/13, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors”, [http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502%2C0%2C2494970.story), accessed 6/24/13, Los Angeles Times writer)

Politicians who have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the [Obama](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/barack-obama-PEPLT007408.topic) administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. [Ileana Ros-Lehtinen](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/ileana-ros-lehtinen-PEPLT005659.topic), a South Florida Republican whose efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy throughout her 24 years in [Congress](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/u.s.-congress-ORGOV0000131.topic), hailed the State Department decision as “reaffirming the threat that the Castro regime represents.”¶ Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School, blamed the continued branding of Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians “pandering for a certain political base.” He also said President Obama and Secretary of State [John F. Kerry](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/john-kerry-PEPLT003513.topic) have failed to make a priority of removing the impediment to better relations with Cuba.¶ “As much as I’d like to see the Castro regime gone and an open and free Cuba, it takes away from the State Department’s credibility when they include countries on the list that aren’t even close” to threatening Americans, Aramesh said.¶ Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state sponsor” list, he said, pointing to [Pakistan](http://www.latimes.com/topic/intl/pakistan-PLGEO00000020.topic) as a prime example. Although Islamabad “very clearly supports terrorist and insurgent organizations,” he said, the U.S. government has long refused to provoke its ally in the region with the official censure.¶ The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel.¶ There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a [commentary](http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/open-cuba-to-us-travelers/1057098) for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly failed for nearly 50 years.”¶ The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay.¶ It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State [Hillary Rodham Clinton](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/hillary-clinton-PEPLT007433.topic) last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the government’s list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime.¶ “It’s a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend,” Aramesh said. “President Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.”

C. US refusal to identify its transgressions as acts of terror

Bolender, 13 – your author (Keith Bolender is a Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a freelance journalist, and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People”. April 22, 2013, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, <http://www.coha.org/22355/#sthash.u6Y6mHLD.dpuf)>
On an emotional level, Havana has long drawn attention to the double standard that permits Washington to label others as a terrorist state, all the while ignoring its own culpability in the multiple acts of terror that have been responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent Cuban civilians. This relatively unreported history stretches back to the early months following Castro’s victory over the Batista regime, when the United States was determined to eliminate the Cuban revolution not only though economic and political means, but with violence.

2. No spillover from the Cuban terror narrative to the broader War on Terror

A. Too many alt causes

Jackson, 7 – your author (Richard Jackson is Reader in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, and a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV). He is the founding editor of the journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2007, “Terrorism Studies and the Politics of State Power,” Paper prepared for International Studies Association’s 47th annual convention,<http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1951/ISA-2007-Paper-CTS-Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1)>

In short, there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly selective and hypocritical manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely called terrorists, despite overwhelming evidence of the use of terror and intimidation against civilians by many Afghan warlords.75 This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad Al Islamiya group is typically described as a terrorist organisation with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords who also use violence against civilians are exempted from the terrorist label.76 Similarly, Cuba remains on the State Department‟s list of „state sponsors of terrorism‟ largely because it hosts a few former ETA members, but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,77 former Latin American state terrorists78 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups79 is completely ignored. And Iran and Syria‟s sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist groups is the subject of substantial academic analysis, while Pakistan‟s support for Kashmiri militants rarely featured in the first few years of the „war on terror‟ – although it is now an increasingly prominent point of contention.80 Most glaringly, and as already mentioned, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia and Indonesia – and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.81 – is simply never discussed in the mainstream „terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature. The result of these omissions is a discourse that for whatever reasons appears to many outside observers as biased towards official U.S. views.

B. Delisting strengthens SST list credibility

Byman, 5 (Daniel, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is Director of the Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies as well as and he holds a joint appointment with the Georgetown Department of Government, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism, pp. 269-270), Associate Professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service)

This inconsistency, in turn, has undermined the effectiveness of the list. When countries like Cuba that have at best marginal involvement in terrorism in recent years are included, while others that are extremely active such as Pakistan are excluded, the "name and shame" power of the list itself suffers. Not surprisingly, other states refuse to see the list itself as proof that the state is involved in terrorism. US officials involved in counterterrorism tried unsuccessfully to change this: Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, told critics: "if you have a problem with Cuba on human rights, get your own sanctions, don't use mine."" Such efforts were resisted because politicians feared that removing a state from the terrorism list would confer legitimacy on it. Ironically, because it is so hard to get off the list and because the various punishments (intentionally) interfere with negotiations and bilateral relations, executive branch officials are often reluctant to put states on the list in the first place. Thus, though the Taliban hosted Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida in 1996 and quickly emerged as the dominant power in the country, the regime was not listed as a sponsor of terrorism. In part this was because sponsorship would require recognition of the government, but it was also felt to tie the executive branch's hands with relatively little benefit. Moreover, the forms of pressure used can often be blunt, hindering the segments of society that might be more pro-American, or otherwise failing to affect the regime properly." Similarly, Pakistan was not designated a sponsor again in part because this was seen as a measure that would do more harm than good. Getting on the list is often a contentious process, but once on it is difficult to be removed. In theory, the state sponsor list is meant to be flexible. The State Department notes that "The bar for a state or a group being removed from a US terrorism list is and must be high – it must end all involvement in any facet of terrorism, including passive support, and satisfy all US counterterrorism concerns."" By including passive support, however, the criteria can easily become insurmountable. 1-or example, many states in the Middle East – including almost every US ally–laud the Palestinian terrorist group HAMAS, seeing it as a legitimate resistance movement. Forcing states to end any ties to HAMAS, even the most minimal such as meeting with HAMAS leaders to show solidarity, would damage their legitimacy at home. Similarly, some groups draw on fundraising among a state's citizens (as discussed in Chapter 8); halting this may require US government assistance through financial monitoring training, not US government sanctions. Because the criteria are so politicized, in reality a state has to go from an adversary of the United States to an ally to get off the list, a move that would require many states to dramatically remake their foreign policy and at times their very government, not just to end their links to terrorism. The inability to get off the list in turn makes the list even less effective. If states fear that a true change in their behavior will only result in the bar regarding terrorism being raised or that other concerns such as human rights will come into play, they have no incentive to reduce support for terrorism.

3. The current War on Terror narrative is good

A. It sustains great power coalitions
Dibb 2 (Paul, head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, The Future of International Coalitions, Washington Quarterly 25:2, lexis, AG)

The United States is leading a moral campaign. In World War II, the firm conviction that evil was being fought greatly simplified the Allied effort. n10 The image of a "just war" nourished the Allies' willingness to fight the war to the bitter end. The difference between the war against terrorism and World War II, of course, is that in World War II the Allied powers were all the victims of aggression, simplifying the task of constructing a wartime consensus. Until and unless terrorists attack other Western powers, maintaining the coalition in the longer term will be difficult. The sense of moral outrage, however, has certainly led to the view that this war is just.

B. Coalition collapse causes World War Three – most probable scenario

Dyer 6 (Gwynne, lecturer on international affairs, Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History, U London, If 9/11 hadn’t happened, <http://www.nowtoronto.com/issues/2006-09-14/news_story.php>, AG)

There may even be a hidden benefit in the concept of a "war on terror." It is a profoundly dishonest concept, since it is actually directed mainly against Muslim groups that have grievances against the various great powers: Chechens against Russia, Muslim Uyghurs against China, Kashmiri Muslims and their Pakistani cousins against India, and practically everybody in the Arab world and Iran against the U.S. and Britain. The terrorists' methods are reprehensible, but their grievances are often real. The determination of the great powers to oppose not only their methods but their goals is also real. That gives them a common enemy and a shared strategy. The main risk at this point in history is that the great powers will drift back into some kind of alliance confrontation. Key resources are getting scarcer, the climate is changing, and the rise of China and India means that the pecking order of the great powers is due to change again in the relatively near future. Given those preconditions, any strategic analyst worth his salt could draw up a dozen different scenarios of disaster by lunchtime.

Ethics

1. The flawed thesis of their movement ensures failure

A. Cuba’s inclusion on the SST list is justified

Cardenas, 11 (Jose R, “It’s not time to remove Cuba from the terror list”, February 18, 2011, Former Acting Assistant White House Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean)

Removing Cuba from the terrorist list has [long been a goal](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/04/AR2010010402723.html) of the anti-embargo lobby. It seems the designation tends to arise as an inconvenient talking point when trying to persuade others as to why the United States needs a wholesale reversal of its policy towards the last dictatorship in the Americas. But to fatuously claim that the reason Cuba remains on the terrorist list is one of "emotion" -- presumably among Cuban-American voters in South Florida -- is to willfully ignore decades of the historical record. This is a regime that since even before it seized power has used terror as an instrument of both domestic and international policy to achieve its goals. At the height of the Castro regime's international influence in the late 1970s into the 1980s, Cuba helped to build up and unify at least 27 different terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere, totaling about [25,000 armed and trained members](http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/03/world/latin-guerrillas-joining-forces-us-officers-say.html?scp=1&sq=march%203,%201987%20cuba&st=cse) by 1987. Around the same time, the State and Defense Departments [estimated](http://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/1912111) that a minimum of 20,000 individuals from around the world, including more than 10,000 Latin Americans, had attended one or more of the more than fifty guerrilla or terrorist training courses offered in Cuban military facilities since Castro came to power (the most infamous of trainees being, of course, [Carlos the Jackal](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_the_Jackal#cite_note-4)). Nor was the Castro regime content to victimize the unfortunate citizens of Latin America and Africa, as it aiding and abetting terrorist groups operating on our own soil, including the [Weather Underground](http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/espionage/cuba-weathermen.htm) (of Bill Ayres fame) and the militant Puerto Rican group, the [Macheteros](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boricua_Popular_Army). Victor Manuel Gerena, a mastermind of the Macheteros' 1983 robbery of a Well Fargo depot in Connecticut, has lived safely in Cuba for decades, joining U.S. fugitives Joanne Chesimard and Charlie Hill, who are wanted in the U.S. for the murders of U.S. police officers, as well as some [70 other fugitives](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/12/world/americas/12cuba.html) from U.S. justice. In addition, following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Cuban intelligence sent numerous fake tipsters into U.S. embassies abroad to sidetrack and impede U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. (Also, following 9/11, U.S. authorities rolled up the Cuban spy Ana Belen Montes at the Defense Intelligence Agency, not wanting to risk her information being passed on by Cuba to other U.S. enemies.) But the anti-embargo lobby wants us to forget all that. They will tell uninformed listeners that in 1992 the Castro regime "renounced" the use of violence to achieve its political ends. But there has never been any profound change of heart, expressions of remorse, or even compensation offered for victims of Cuban-sponsored terrorism. No, it was merely a change of tactics, forced on the Castro regime by the fact that in 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and, with it, its billions in annual subsidies to Cuba. Castro could simply no longer afford to do it, at least on the scale to which he had become accustomed. Indeed, the Castro regime can no more renounce violence as an instrument of policy than it can renounce its totalitarian state. Clearly, Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of terror is well-earned. The Obama Administration should ignore specious entreaties to delist Cuba as a state sponsor of terror. As has been proven over and over, tyranny's best friend is a failure to remember. If Fidel Castro or his brother Raul wants to be removed from the State Department list, there are any number of actions they could take: true expressions of repentance, concessions, recompense, and an accounting for past misdeeds. I, for one, am not holding my breath.

B. The Cuban government is responsible for the impact of US sanctions

Lopez, 99 (George A., March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “More Ethical than Not: Sanctions as Surgical Tools: Response to “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy”” page 145-146, Wiley Library, accessed 7/5/13, PhD from Syracuse University)

Gordon takes the facts that harm comes to innocents and that sanctions are imposed by sanctioners and mistakenly makes the pain of the former the direct and singular responsibility of the latter. She refuses to deal with the intermediary and decision-making role that leadership in a target state plays in determining the impact of sanctions. While she blames the imposers of sanctions for treating a general population instrumentally, she appears not to acknowledge at all the moral responsibility of despicable leaders who victimize their own people instrumentally through the manipulation of sanctions. While the impact of sanctions maybe either immoral or moral, any judgment regarding their impact on innocent people must be assessed by examining the responses of the sanctioned country’s leader and in light of the international humanitarian relief effort mobilized on behalf of the innocent. Again here, the case of Iraq focuses the discussion on the burden of responsibility borne by Iraqi leaders.

2. Their philosophical stance is ethically bankrupt

A. The Cuban government continues to commit human rights atrocities

Tamayo, 12 (Juan O. Tamayo, 6/2/12, The Miami Herald, “UN panel blasts Cuba on human rights abuses,” http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/02/v-fullstory/2828219/un-panel-blasts-cuba-on-human.html, accessed 7-2-13)

The U.N.’s Committee Against Torture hammered Cuba on Friday for a lengthy string of human rights abuses and repeatedly complained the island had provided few or none of the details about specific allegations of abuses that it had requested.¶ The panel noted that it was “concerned by reports denouncing the use of coercive methods during (police) interrogations, particularly the denial of sleep, detention under conditions of isolation and exposure to sudden changes in temperatures.”¶ On Cuba’s prisons, it wrote that it “continues to be supremely concerned by the reports received about the … overcrowding, malnutrition, lack of hygiene and healthy conditions (and) adequate medical attention.”¶ There have been thousands of complaints of short-term detentions of dissidents, it added, singling out José Luis Ferrer García and Oscar Elias Biscet. And Cuban officials never explained the deaths of dissidents Orlando Zapata Tamayo and Juan Wilfredo Soto García.¶ Cuba should establish an independent body to gather, investigate and report on allegations of government abuses, and should meet its promise to allow a visit by the U.N.’s top official on several types of mistreatments, the committee noted in a 6,000-word report.¶ The report summed up the panel’s conclusions after its May 22-23 hearings in Switzerland on Cuba’s compliance with the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Marked “unedited,” it was issued by the U.N. media office in Geneva.¶ Using the U.N.’s typically diplomatic language, the report noted the panel “laments,” “expresses concern,” “still worries,” “disagrees,” “has serious reservations,” “views with concern,” “considers it indispensable” and is “seriously concerned.”¶ But the report Friday amounted to a harsh and detailed indictment of Cuba’s human rights record, especially in areas that involve physical punishments or abuses, such as the justice and prison systems and the harassment of dissidents.¶ Cuba’s own report on its compliance with the convention on torture, presented to the panel in May, was more than nine years late and “does not fully meet the guidelines” set by the panel, it noted. The 10-member committee reviews countries’ records on a rotating basis.¶ In a sharply worded section, the report urged Cuba “to investigate, without delay, exhaustively, without bias and in an efficient way, all deaths of prisoners.” Cuba told the panel that prison officials were not responsible for any of the 202 such deaths in 2010-2011, but gave no further information.¶ The report also blasted Cuba for the rapid increase in the use of short-term arrests of dissidents without any judicial orders, usually to keep opposition activists away from activities. Cuban officials told the panel last month that all detentions follow due process.¶ Despite Havana’s denials, panel member Fernando Mariño told a news conference Friday, “it seems that this has been generalized of late.” Human rights activists in Havana reported the number of such arrests doubled from 2010 to 2011.¶ The panel also condemned the “restrictions on freedom of movement, invasive security operations, physical aggressions and other acts of intimidation and harassment presumably committed by the National Revolutionary Police or members of the Organs of State Security.”

B. Engagement with human rights abusers makes you complicit with Evil

Gordon & Gordon, 95 (Haim and Rivca, “Sartre and Evil: Guidelines for a Struggle,” 1995, xvi-xvii, Questia, 7-2-13, senior lecturer at Ben-Gurion University, and independent Scholar)

Put differently, this book is also about us, a man and a woman who, often with others, have for years been struggling for freedom, for dialogue, for justice, for human rights in Israel and in the Middle East, and about what we have learned from Sartre that has helped us to conduct this daily struggle. Yet it should also be clear: We are not standard do-gooders. When we use the word "struggle," we mean fighting, attacking, pointing at evildoers, demanding that they be prosecuted. We mean accepting the profound loneliness that often characterizes such struggles. We mean living with the stupid decisions and the mistakes that we have often made, and, we hope, learning from them. We mean knowing that we too have done Evil. Like Sartre we do not need to be identified with a party or an organization or a large group when we attack an evildoer, although we are, at times, happy when such occurs. For instance, when human rights are blatantly abused in the Gaza Strip, or when violence against women is ignored by the Israeli police, we are unwilling to compromise such a destruction of human freedom with the goals of a party or an organization so that the organization or party can attain its political ends from this Evil. Learning from Sartre, we condemn the Evil and the oppression and exploitation as loudly and clearly as possible. And like Sartre, our condemnations often fall on deaf ears. Again and again we have failed, as this book will often indicate. The Israeli military administration in Gaza, the Israeli press, Israeli politicians, other intellectuals and academics, and even other human rights organizations have often made us feel frustrated, impotent, stuck, irrelevant. But we continue. It is in this kind of struggle, we believe, that one can learn much from Sartre's writings. Hence, in what follows, while we shall discuss in detail and in depth quite a few philosophical themes central to Sartre's writings, we shall always attempt to suggest how these themes can help in the day-to-day struggle against Evil. To do so, we often add to our discussion of Sartre's insights on Evil an instance from our personal experiences or from events in the world that these insights have helped to clarify. It is in this kind of struggle, we believe, that one can learn much from Sartre 's writings. Hence, in what follows, while we shall discuss in detail and in depth quite a few philosophical themes central to Sartre's writings, we shall always attempt to suggest how these themes can help in the day-to-day struggle against Evil. To do so, we often add to our discussion of Sartre's insights on Evil an instance from our personal experiences or from events in the world that these insights have helped to clarify. We firmly believe that Sartre would have preferred such a book to a strict scholarly study of his relationship to Evil. He repeatedly pointed out that he was deeply concerned with the relevance of his writings to day-to-day praxis, to day-to-day struggles, to the situation in which persons find themselves. He wanted his writings to make a concrete difference in the world, not only to be a topic of analysis and discussion among scholars and philosophers. We also believe that Sartre would have liked a book that at times reeks of the blood, sweat, and tears -- and yes, the rage, the passion, the debilitating loneliness, and the ongoing fight against impotence -- that characterize any worthy struggle for freedom today.

3. Privileging ethics over political consequences dooms their movement to failure

Isaac, 02 (Jeffrey, Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Dissent, “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To ac- complish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond moral- ity. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, re- flecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suf- fers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Ab- juring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of poli- tics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically re- pudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any ef- fect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pur- suit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and histori- cally contextualized ways. Moral absolutism in- hibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Epistemology

1. Double bind – either the reframing of the dominant narrative surrounding terrorism is inevitable or their ideological strategy fails to accomplish anything

Horgan, 8 (John and Michael J., Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1 Issue 1, “A case against ‘Critical Terrorism

Studies’”, p. 52, accessed 6/28/13, Professor at Penn State, and Boyle, Professor at University of St. Andrews)

Another critique of terrorism studies derives from the general critique of the influence of ‘problem-solving’ theory in terrorism studies (Gunning 2007b). The argument here, and deriving from Cox, is that terrorism studies tends to take the world as it is, rather than challenging its foundations of social and political order, and forsakes efforts to find ways of applying scholarly knowledge to relieving the burdens of those oppressed by unjust social and political structures (Cox 1981, p. 129). In other words, the charge is that the study of terrorism has a predominant status quo bias, which leads it to focus on how to solve problems for those in power, at the expense of ‘emancipation’. The ‘mode’ of thinking of terrorism studies is thus dominated by instrumental rationality, to the detriment of reflective approaches and interdisciplinary research. We believe this is overstating the case. Like much of political science, the study of terrorism has been influenced by the logic of ‘problem-solving’ theory and includes a strong dose of instrumental rationality. But to imply that all those working within an empirical tradition of research in terrorism studies do not challenge the status quo, or suggest uncomfortable truths to those in power, is misleading. Many of the serious scholars who work in this field are sympathetic to the normative goals that CTS scholars espouse, and are unafraid to speak truth to power when needed. For example, many terrorism scholars do not hesitate to tell governments bluntly that unpopular certain foreign policy choices (such as the US invasion of Iraq or the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza) generate terrorism, and that addressing pervasive economic and social inequalities is an essential part of counter-terrorism.4 In fact, in a 2004 ‘Open Letter to the American People’, over 700 security studies scholars in the USA and elsewhere signed their names to a case which included the following: We judge that the current American policy centered around the war in Iraq is the most misguided one since the Vietnam period, one which harms the cause of the struggle against extreme Islamist terrorists. One result has been a great distortion in the terms of public debate on foreign and national security policy-an emphasis on speculation instead of facts. (Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy (2004)5 The list included such well-known terrorism experts as Jessica Stern, David Rapoport (Co-editor of Terrorism and Political Violence), and Mia Bloom. If terrorism scholars, including these, were solely interested in telling comforting lies to those in power, they would shy away from these uncomfortable facts and would certainly not publicly identify themselves with such an openly critical stance. Moreover, many of the ‘embedded experts’ identified by name in existing CTS work have deep liberal concerns for economic and social justice (Hoffman 2007, Wilkinson 1977, and subsequent revisions). Their ambitions may not be entirely ‘emancipatory’ (Linklater 1996), but neither are they content to accept the world as it is. Let us be clear: within the broad community of self-ascribed terrorism ‘experts’ there are some charlatans who will do whatever they need to get close to power and to solve problems for them. But these are not representative of the serious scholars in the field, and even those who do not adopt the language of critical theory often work with the same social, political and moral purpose of advancing social justice as CTS scholars. Serious and reflective scholars of terrorism also do not deny the observation that theory is often for someone, and for some purpose. What they do not share is the explicit normative and ideological commitment to ‘emancipation’, however defined. One of our chief concerns about CTS is that the precise meaning of this commitment to emancipation has not been made clear, beyond the basic point that ‘emancipation’ would involve strengthening the voices of moderation and increasing the political voice of some dissident groups (McDonald 2007, p. 257). These are worthwhile goals, certainly, but not unique to CTS in any respect. So the analytic value of this maddeningly vague notion of emancipation in this instance is not yet obvious to us. How exactly does attacking the concept of ‘terrorism’ generate greater prospects for freedom in existing social relations, or produce a broadly progressive outcome (McDonald 2007, p. 257)?6 In part due to the fact that CTS advocates have not yet made their ontological and epistemological commitments or their intellectual debts within critical theory clear, it remains unclear just who has agency in their account, how ‘emancipation’ would be achieved, and to what substantive normative and political goals ‘emancipation’ is directed.

Not every form of state violence is terrorism. Alleging this drains the term ‘terrorism’ of any real meaning.

Lutz, Professor at Indiana University, 10

(James M., December 2010, “A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, volume: 4, p. 31-40)

It needs to be recognized that not every form of violence that is evil or reprehensible, when performed by governments, constitutes terrorism. Genocide is far worse than terrorism, but genocide does not primarily seek to create fear in a target audience. In fact governments undertaking genocide may even seek to lull the victims into a false sense of security to make the killing easier. This was the case with the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the Jews during the Holocaust and, more recently, according to some reports, also with the Tutsi in Rwanda. Similarly, harsh repression of non-violent dissent is evil, but it is usually not terrorism as long as it is not indiscriminate. Slavery is a pernicious attack on human dignity, but it is not terrorism. Institutional violence in which some citizens have fewer rights or situations where equal rights are not equally protected are to be deplored, but it is not terrorism (unless accompanied by government-tolerated vigilante violence intended to enforce the control of particular groups). It is quite legitimate and desirable to focus public and scholarly attention on these issues, but it is not appropriate to consider them to be examples of terrorism. To fault those who study other forms of terrorism than state terrorism, as CTS scholars do, is unjust since these type of situations are actually frequently analyzed in other academic (sub-)disciplines. Therefore, it cannot be said that ‘ orthodox’ analysts “refuse to examine cases of state terrorism” (very broadly defined). [20] If almost every example of government use of force to maintain law and order is labeled state terrorism, then the concept of ‘terrorism’ ceases to have any real meaning and simply becomes a polemic term used to apply a negative and pejorative label to a government or states that an observer dislikes.

CTS reifies current power structures and fails to effect broader counter terror policies

Edelmann 11, PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations, 11

[Florian, December, Forum Regensburger Politikwissenschaftler, “The Dialectic of Construction-Deconstruction II:

A Critical Assessment of the Research Agenda of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) Approaches”, <http://www.regensburger-politikwissenschaftler.de/frp_working_paper_12_2011.pdf>, accessed 6/29/13, VJ]

Analyzing the function civil society has performed in the (tacit) settlement of the Basque conflict Tellidis argues that CTS approaches ultimately reinforce the state-centric bias of tradi-tional terrorism studies. While these approaches adequately theorize the ambivalent role govern-mental counter-terrorism policies may have played or often play in prolonged conflicts, CTS’ fo-cus on the core antagonism ›state vs. terrorism‹ risks underestimating the importance and ulti-mately denying the agency of the very human beings whose security is at stake from both sides of this antagonism. Thus, an important, if not the most decisive, step in breaking mutually reinforc-ing circles of political violence is left under-studied: the societal credibility of mutually exclusive claims of legitimacy has to be unwound (Tellidis 2011: 185). In other words, the reference point of critical studies has the (unintended) potential to reify knowledge claims of so-called ›orthodox‹ reconstructions of terrorism. These findings, it is argued here, point to a more profound problem of CTS approaches. Unlike Tellidis, we will show that the crucial problem is not that critical scholars are not critical enough and therefore stick to an “orthodoxy light” that reifies traditional approaches. Rather, it is suggested here that the core of critique is too loosely defined and the approach is too inclusive. Therefore, an external rallying point is necessary for the critical project: the construction of ›orthodoxy‹. We will locate this problem in the concept of deepening terrorism research. On the one hand, a deepened perspective aims to unravel “the ontological and ideological assumptions and interests behind terrorism studies” (Toros/Gunning 2009: 89) assuming that no (theoretical) reconstruction of a social phenomenon is value-free or objective in the epistemolog-ical sense. This aspect strongly relies on another Coxian principle that states that “[t]heory is al-ways for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128, original emphasis). Deepening a field of study thus moves to render the latent underpinnings and contingencies of its worldview and knowledge claims manifest or explicit (Jackson et al. 2011: 43). On the other hand, the “interpre-tivist face of critical terrorism studies” (Jarvis 2009: 20) focuses explicitly on destabilizing and dis-turbing common or traditional understandings of the key term. This post-positivist perspective on deepening terminology and research tries to explicate another aspect of terrorism discourse which usually remains implicit. Its aim is to unwind the ways in which acts of political violence - 6 - are socially (re-)constructed as being ›terrorist‹. Asking how a distinct significance is being in-scribed into such events, for example through media coverage and scholarly assessment, an inter-pretivist approach to deepening dissolves the great narrative ›terrorism‹ into its different representa-tions (ibid: 18-20; Jackson 2009a: 68). While the first interpretation of deepening stresses underlying belief systems of terrorism discourse and the second focuses on how these “myths” (Stohl 2008: 5) are perpetuated, both aspects can be related to a common denominator: an emphasis on inter-preting and deconstructing the discursive practices of terrorism and its study (Joseph 2009: 95). This common denominator can be traced back to an ontology that considers terrorism as a social fact, i.e. the social (re-)construction of certain events, rather than an objective or brute fact. Given the already mentioned characterization of CTS as a ›broad church‹ of critical voices sharing a set of shared core commitments (Edelmann 2011: 3), it is little surprise that different conclusions are dawn from the common basic assumption. However, the very way in which the underlying constructivist ontology is conceptualized requires a closer look. As Joseph points out, social practices of knowledge production and re-production require a reference point in the ›real‹ world – only (social) facts that have happened can be spoken about and remembered. The crucial point is thus not whether something like an objective reality outside our perception exists but what reality we refer to as objectivity – i.e. what we take for the real (Joseph 2011: 33-34). It has already been pointed out that the central reference point for the project of CTS is problematic: the ›orthodoxy‹ of terrorism research is a socially constructed representation of a heterodox field of research (Edelmann 2011: 6). Joseph argues furthermore that CTS like many critical approach-es in the IR miss a central element of Frankfurt School thought when they equate positivism (or in our case: ›orthodoxy‹) with objectivism and thereby ultimately dissolve discourse and social construction from empirical reality. Rather, the Frankfurt School’s core critique of empiricist identity thinking is that it takes the fetishised manifestation of a certain production structure as reality – appearance is taken for essence (ibid. 24-26). Hence, a mere juxtaposition of social and brute facts or positivist and post-positivist approaches is prone to reify similar identity thinking: the reified appearance is the discursive construction of certain concepts like ›terrorism‹, respec-tively its ›orthodox‹ study. Consequently, it is argued here that deepening terrorism research by try-ing to deconstruct or explicate the underlying assumptions and knowledge claims of its ›ortho-doxy‹ might reify the very concepts of conventional terrorism studies. This is ultimately rein-forced through the broad, inclusive, and heterogeneous approach to traditional scholar’s work: while CTS’ critique revolves around a shared set of perceived shortcomings of this body of knowledge, CTS approaches widely differ in determining the degree to which its underlying as-sumptions have to be rejected (Jackson 2009a: 69-70). More precisely, while most of the identi-fied concrete underlying assumptions of traditional approaches – their state-centric notion of secu-rity, their status-quo orientation, and their biased, actor-based concept of terrorism to repeat just a few of the discussed CTS’ arguments – are plainly opposed by CTS scholars, they treat the more abstract assumptions – the ontological and epistemological foundations – somewhat more cautiously. At instances, they seem to struggle somehow with the consequences of their own core concepts. Namely, the precise extent to which discourse theory, post-positivism or constructivist perspectives have to be employed to deepen terrorism research remains an open question. This point is vividly highlighted by the two adjacent, yet very distinct notions of deepening outlined above. In the first interpretation, deepened research is an approach to knowledge produc-tion that is first and foremost indebted to self- (and other-) reflectivity: the foundational category ›terrorism‹ is not per se rejected as an essentialism, rather the essentialist use of the category is the core - 7 - of its critique. In other words, there is a form of violence out there that can and indeed should be disclaimed as terrorist but the disclaimer should not (indeed cannot) be used a-historically, inde-pendently, or void of context. Accordingly, traditional, problem-solving approaches are not re-jected per se, but only if and insofar as they adhere to a strictly positivist epistemology treating ter-rorism solely as an object of knowledge and not as a product of a historical contingent situation. Thus, CTS can and indeed should not be limited to assay the discourse of terrorism (To-ros/Gunning 2009: 92). Rather, discourse analyze is a tool of CTS amongst others as long as it serves to engage the traditional and the critical scholars’ work in looking beyond the surface, to point out underlying assumptions and knowledge claims, and to re-construct the historical and social context of political violence and its representations. According to this reading, a deepened critique ultimately has to become concrete and has to seek to influence (counter-terrorist) policy decisions (Gunning 2007a: 383 and 387). This understanding of the CTS project tries to establish a middle ground and therefore requires, as Toros and Gunning argue, at least a minimalist foun-dational base; poststructuralist anti-foundationalism facilitates only the destabilization of con-cepts, whereas the aim of a concrete, immanent critique is to go beyond mere destabilization and to proceed working